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The semantics for counterfactuals due to David Lewis has been challenged on the basis of unlikely,
or impossible, events. Such events may skew a given similarity order in favour of those possible
worlds which exhibit them. By updating the relational structure of a model according to a ceteris
paribus clause one forces out, in a natural manner, those possible worlds which do not satisfy the
requirements of the clause. We develop a ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning capable
of performing such actions, and offer several alternative (relaxed) interpretations of ceteris paribus.
We apply this framework in a way which allows us to reason counterfactually without having our
similarity order skewed by unlikely events. This continues the investigation of formal ceteris paribus
reasoning, which has previously been applied to preferences [2], logics of game forms [11], and
questions in decision-making [25], among other areas [18].
1 Introduction
The principal task of this paper is to work towards integrating ceteris paribus modalities into conditional
logics so that some dissonant analyses of counterfactuals may be reconciled. We also suggest that ceteris
paribus clauses may be understood dynamically, in the sense of dynamic epistemic logic [8], and we
interpret our resulting ceteris paribus logic accordingly. Ceteris paribus clauses implicitly qualify many
conditional statements that formulate laws of science and economics. A ceteris paribus clause adds to
a statement a proviso requiring that other variables or states of affairs not explicitly mentioned in the
statement are kept constant, thus ruling out benign defeaters. For instance, Avogadro’s law says that if
the volume of some ideal gas increases then, everything else held equal, the number of moles of that gas
increases proportionally. Varying the temperature or pressure could provide situations that violate the
plain statement of the law, but the ceteris paribus clause accounts for those. It specifically isolates the
interaction between volume and number of moles by keeping everything else equal. In the same spirit,
the Nash equilibrium in game theory is a solution concept that picks strategy profiles in which none of
the agents could unilaterally (i.e., keeping the actions of others constant, or equal) deviate to their own
advantage.
We may understand a ceteris paribus clause as a linguistic device intended to shrink the scope of the
sentence qualified by the clause. For instance, when I make the utterance “I prefer fish to beef, ceteris
paribus” I may mean something different from if I simply uttered “I prefer fish to beef.” By enforcing
the ceteris paribus condition I rule out some situations which affect my preference. For example if,
whenever I eat fish I’m beaten with a mallet, while whenever I eat beef I’m left in peace, I might retract
the second utterance and maintain the first. The ceteris paribus clause reduces the number of states of
affairs under consideration. For modal logicians, ‘ruling out’ states of affairs amounts to strengthening an
accessibility relation, consequently changing the relational structure of a model. This bears similarity to
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the epistemological forcing of Vincent Hendricks [12], which seeks to rule out ‘irrelevant alternatives’ in
a way which allows knowledge in spite of the possibility of error. Wesley Holliday [13] develops several
interpretations of the epistemic operator K based on the relevant alternatives epistemology; namely,
that in order for an agent to have knowledge of a proposition, that agent must eliminate each relevant
alternative. Holliday’s semantics are based on the semantics for counterfactuals due to David Lewis [15].
One could see relevant worlds as those which keep things equal. When reasoning using Avogadro’s law,
the relevant possible worlds are those where the temperature and pressure have not changed. Thus, in
order for an agent to have knowledge, that agent must eliminate the alternatives among the worlds which
‘keep things equal.’
Previously, ceteris paribus formalisms have been given for logics of preference [2] and logics of
game forms [11]. Here we extend the analysis to counterfactual reasoning. The importance of counter-
factuals in game theory is well known (see, for instance, [19]). For example, Bassel Tarbush [23] argues
that the Sure-Thing Principle1 ought to be understood as an inherently counterfactual notion. We will
motivate our discussion by thinking through Kit Fine’s well-known ‘minor-miracles’ argument [10], a
putative counterexample to Lewis’ semantics. We will argue that ceteris paribus logic, suitably adapted
to conditionals, provides a natural response to this kind of argument. Moreover, we will see that ceteris
paribus logic reveals a useful feature missing from the standard formalisation of counterfactuals; namely,
the explicit requirement that certain propositions must have their truth remain fixed during the evaluation
of the counterfactual. This is implicitly thought to hold, to some degree, when one works with models
which have similarity orders or systems of spheres. The conditional logic of Graham Priest [17] makes
just that assumption, but with no syntactic assurance. Ceteris paribus logic provides, in addition to the
underlying similarity order over possible worlds, a syntactic apparatus to reason with such ceteris paribus
clauses directly in the object language.
2 Counterfactuals
Here we shall formalise counterfactuals in the style of Lewis. Let Prop be a set of propositional variables.
We are concerned with models of the form M= (W,,V ) such that the following obtain.
1. W is a non-empty set of possible worlds.
2.  is a family {w}w∈W of similarity orders, i.e., relations on Ww×Ww (with Ww ⊆W ) such that:
• w ∈Ww,
• w is reflexive, transitive and total, and
• w≺w v for all v ∈Ww \{w}.
3. V is a valuation function assigning a subset V (p)⊆W to each propositional variable p ∈ Prop.
Intuitively, Ww is the set of worlds which are entertainable from w. Worlds which are not entertainable
from w are deemed simply too dissimilar from w to be considered. Say that u is at least as similar to w
as v is when uw v, and that it is strictly more similar when u≺w v.
If M satisfies each of the three requirements we call M a conditional model. A relation ≤ is said to
be well-founded if for every non-empty S ⊆W the set
1An outcome o of an action A is a sure-thing if, were any other action A′ to be chosen, o would remain an outcome. The
Sure-Thing Principle [20] states that sure-things should not affect an agent’s preferences.
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MinM≤ (S) = {v ∈ S∩W : there is no u with u < v} (1)
is non-empty.2 We will suppress the superscript M if it is clear from the context which model we’re
discussing. If a model M = (W,,V ) has only well-founded similarity orders we say that M satisfies
the limit assumption. For ease of exposition, we will assume that our conditional models satisfy the limit
assumption. Of course, we may generalise the semantics for counterfactuals in the usual way [15], so
that our results work for models which do not satisfy the limit assumption as well.
Definition 1 (Language L) The language L of counterfactuals is given by the following gram-
mar
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ψ | ϕ ψ .
We define ϕ ∧ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∨¬ψ), ϕ → ψ := ¬ϕ ∨ψ , ϕ ψ := ¬(ϕ ¬ψ).
Definition 2 (Semantics) Let M= (W,,V ) be a well-founded conditional model. Then
JpKM = V (p)
J¬ϕKM = W \ JϕKM
Jϕ ∨ψKM = JϕKM∪ JψKM
Jϕ ψKM = {w ∈W : Minw(JϕKM)⊆ JψKM}.
Let w ∈W . If w ∈ JϕK we write M,w |= ϕ , and if w 6∈ JϕK we write M,w 6|= ϕ .
3 The Nixon argument
There is a problem dating back to the 1970s [1, 4, 10] surrounding the semantics for counterfactuals
proposed by Lewis. We have found that our ‘ceteris paribus counterfactuals’ (defined below) provide a
unique perspective on the problem (a putative counterexample). The argument goes as follows. Assume,
during the Cold War, that President Richard Nixon had access to a device which launches a nuclear mis-
sile at the Soviets. All Nixon is required to do is press a button on the device. Consider the counterfactual
if Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. Call it the Nixon couterfac-
tual. It is not so difficult to see that the Nixon counterfactual could be true, or could be imagined to be
true. Indeed, one could argue that the Nixon counterfactual ought to be true in any successful theory of
counterfactuals. Fine and Lewis both agree (and so do we) that the counterfactual is true ([10, p. 452],
[16, p. 468]), but Fine used the Nixon counterfactual to argue that the Lewis semantics yields the wrong
verdict. This is because “a world with a single miracle but no holocaust is closer to reality than one with
a holocaust but no miracle.” [10, p. 452] In response, Lewis argues that, provided the Nixon situation is
modelled using a similarity relation which respects a plausible system of priorities (see below), the coun-
terfactual will emerge true. We will provide a different response using ceteris paribus counterfactuals,
but first let us see how Fine and Lewis model the situation.
2As usual, u < v is defined as u≤ v and not v≤ u
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Consider two classes of possible worlds. One class, u, consists of those worlds in which Nixon
pushes the button, and the button successfully launches the missile. The second, v, consists of those
worlds in which Nixon pushes the button, but some small occurrence – such as a minor miracle – prevents
the button’s correct operation. Certainly those worlds where the button does not launch the missile bear
more similarity to the present world than those where it does. This is Fine’s interpretation of Lewis’
semantics. Any world in u has been devastated by nuclear warfare, countless lives have been lost, there
is nuclear winter, etc., whereas worlds in v continue on as they would have done.
To illustrate Fine’s interpretation, let p,s,m,h be the propositions:
p = “Nixon pushes the button,”
s = “the missile successfully launches,”
m = “a miracle prevents the missile being launched,”
h = “a nuclear holocaust occurs,”
and consider the following model, the Fine model:
•
w
F
•
u1
•
u2
•
un
u
p,s,h
•
v1
•
v2
•
vk
v
p,m
An arrow from x to y indicates relative similarity to w, so u1 is more similar to w than u2 is. Arrows
are transitive, and the ‘snake’ arrow between v indicates that vi w u j for every i, j. For each ui ∈ u,
F ,ui |= p∧ s∧ h; and for each vi ∈ v, F ,vi |= p∧m. World w is intended to represent the real world:
Nixon did not push any catastrophic anti-Soviet buttons,3 no nuclear missile was successfully launched
at the Soviets, no miracle prevented any such missile, and no nuclear holocaust occurred. World v1 is
more similar to w than any world in u is, since in any u-world Nixon pushes the button and begins a
nuclear holocaust. By (1), v1 is therefore the minimal p-world. At v1 the proposition h is false, and so
F ,w 6|= p h. Therefore, Fine concludes, the Nixon counterfactual is false in Lewis’ semantics.
In response, Lewis argues that the proper similarity relation to model the Nixon counterfactual should
respect the following system of priorities:
1. It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
2. It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect
match of particular fact prevails.
3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law.
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters
that concern us greatly. ([16, p. 472])
3Although there is no way for us to know this, for the sake of the argument we assume that it is so.
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Based on this system of priorities world u1 is more similar to w than v1 is because “perfect match of
particular fact counts for much more than imperfect match, even if the imperfect match is good enough
to give us similarity in respects that matter very much to us.” [16, p. 470] That is, worlds in v in
which a small miracle prevents the missile being launched may look quite similar to our world, but only
approximately so. And in Lewis’ system of priorities, perfect match outweighs approximate similarity.
The Lewis model, then, looks like this:
•
w
L
•
u1
•
u2
•
un
u
p,s,h
•
v1
•
v2
•
vk
v
p,m
In the Lewis model, u1 is the world most similar to w, and in u1 the missile successfully launches,
there is a nuclear holocaust, and so the Nixon counterfactual is true. Lewis thus responds to Fine by de-
fending a similarity order that favours u1 over v1. He is justified by prioritising perfect over approximate
match in a similarity relation according to the aforementioned system.
The interpretation of the Nixon counterfactual we will offer is in line with Lewis’, though we do not
rely on his system of priorities. We will achieve a resolution similar to his without having to defend a
model different from Fine’s. After all, as Lewis says: “I do not claim that this pre-eminence of perfect
match is intuitively obvious. I do not claim that it is a feature of the similarity relations most likely to
guide our explicit judgments. It is not; else the objection we are considering never would have been
put forward.”[16, p. 470] Instead, we will treat the Nixon counterfactual with an explicit ceteris paribus
clause, dispatching with the unintuitive pre-eminence of perfect match in constructing the similarity
relation.
Our interpretation of the Nixon counterfactual is much like in preference logic, where formal ceteris
paribus reasoning was first applied [2,9,24]. Consider the following diagram, which shows a preference
of a raincoat to an umbrella, provided wearing boots is kept constant:
•
raincoat
no boots •
umbrella
no boots
•
raincoat
boots •
umbrella
boots
Arrows point to more preferred alternatives, and are transitive. Evidently, having an umbrella and boots
is preferred to having a raincoat and no boots. The variation of having boots skews the preference. If a
ceteris paribus clause is enforced, guaranteeing that in either case boots will be worn or boots will not be
worn, then the correct preference is recovered. A similar situation occurs in the logic of counterfactuals.
The variation of certain propositions can skew the similarity order. In Fine’s argument, this is done by
the variation of physical law, a miracle. If we were to restrict the worlds considered during the evaluation
of the counterfactual to those that agree with w on the proposition m, then in F the world v1 would no
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longer assume the role of minimal p-world. Rather, u1 would. In world u1 a nuclear holocaust does
occur, whence the counterfactual becomes true, as desired. This is our resolution of the Nixon argument,
which we next formalise.
4 Ceteris paribus semantics
We introduce into our language a new conditional operator which generalises the usual one. In partic-
ular, it accommodates explicit ceteris paribus clauses. The authors in [2] were the first to define object
languages in this way. They developed a modal logic of ceteris paribus preferences in the sense of von
Wright [24]. For now we will take the ordinary conditional operator and embed within it a finite set of
formulas Γ understood as containing the other things to be kept equal.4
Definition 3 (Language LCP) Let Γ be a finite set of formulas. Then the language LCP is given by the
grammar5
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ψ | [ϕ ,Γ]ψ .
We understand the modality [ϕ ,Γ]ψ as the counterfactual ϕ  ψ subject to the requirement that the
truth of the formulas in Γ does not change. We define ϕ ∧ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∨¬ψ), ϕ → ψ := ¬ϕ ∨ψ ,
〈ϕ ,Γ〉ψ :=¬[ϕ ,Γ]¬ψ . We call the conditional [ϕ ,Γ]ψ a ceteris paribus conditional, or, if the antecedent
is false, a ceteris paribus counterfactual. LCP is interpreted over standard conditional models, and thus
requires no additional semantic information.
Some additional notation is required, however. Let M = (W,,V ) be a conditional model and let
w,u,v ∈W . Let Γ⊆LCP be finite.
• Define the relation ≡Γ over W by u ≡Γ v if for all γ ∈ Γ, M,u |= γ iff M,v |= γ . Then ≡Γ is an
equivalence relation.6
• Set [w]Γ = {u ∈Ww : w≡Γ u}, the collection of w-entertainable worlds which agree with w on Γ.
• Define unlhdΓw :=w ∩ ([w]Γ× [w]Γ), the restriction of w to the above worlds.
Thus if u,v ∈ [w]Γ then either uunlhdΓw v or vunlhdΓw u.
Definition 4 (Semantics) Let M= (W,,V ) be a conditional model. Then
J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKM = {w ∈W : MinunlhdΓw(JϕK
M)⊆ JψKM}.
The semantics for the regular connectives are the same as those in Definition 2. Notice that we recover
the ordinary counterfactual ϕ ψ with [ϕ , /0]ψ .
4The choice of Γ finite is largely technical. We will mention some possibilities and difficulties regarding the case where the
ceteris paribus set Γ may be infinite in our concluding remarks.
5We redefine the language more precisely as Definition 8 in the appendix. For simplicity we work with the one now stated.
6Technically, the relation ≡Γ should be defined together with the semantics in Definition 4 by mutual recursion. Again, we
favour the simpler presentation.
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Consider again the Fine model F . As before we have F ,w 6|= p h, but now
F ,w |= [p,{m}]h. (2)
We thus think about the Nixon counterfactual by way of ceteris paribus reasoning. Allowing the truth
of arbitrary formulas to vary during the evaluation of a counterfactual can distort the given similarity
order, thereby attributing falsity to a sentence which may be intuitively true. By forcing certain formulas
to keep their truth status fixed one can rule out these cases, which has just been demonstrated with (2).
This ceteris paribus qualification is done in preference logic, and indeed in more general scientific and
economic practice.7 The Nixon counterfactual is simply a situation involving a defeater, or an irrelevant
alternative, which ought to be forced out.
5 Ceteris paribus as a dynamic action
The modality [ϕ ,Γ]ψ behaves like a dynamic operator, in the sense of dynamic epistemic logic. For
modality-free formulas ϕ and ψ , evaluating [ϕ ,Γ]ψ at w ∈W amounts to transforming
M= (W,{w}w∈W ,V )
into
[Γ]M= (W,{unlhdΓw}w∈W ,V )
and evaluating ϕ  ψ at [Γ]M,w. This dynamic action is possible since we are altering the relational
structure of M with only a finite amount of information from Γ.
Note that the set Ww on which w is defined on may change after the update. By updating the
model M with a ceteris paribus clause Γ, worlds which disagree on Γ are relegated to the class W \Ww
of infinitely dissimilar (indeed, irrelevant) worlds. Figure 1 shows how the Fine model changes after
being updated by a ceteris paribus clause forcing agreement on m. This forces out the v-worlds from
consideration during the evaluation of the counterfactual; in some sense syntactically ‘correcting’ the
provided similarity order. Of course, if each world already agreed with w on {m} the ceteris paribus
clause would have no effect.
The modality-free condition on ϕ and ψ cannot be removed. In particular, one cannot iterate the dy-
namic ceteris paribus action and retain agreement with the static ceteris paribus counterfactual operator.
To see this, consider the example in Figure 2. Taking Γ = {s} and ∆ = /0, one has M,w |= [p,Γ][q,∆]r,
but [Γ]M,w 6|= p [q,∆]r.
6 Uniformly selecting ceteris paribus clauses
Having created a formalism which accommodates explicit ceteris paribus clauses, one might desire a
method for uniformly selecting the ceteris paribus set Γ. For von Wright [24], ceteris paribus means
fixing every propositional variable which does not occur in the universe of discourse of the ceteris paribus
expression under consideration. More precisely, let UD(ϕ) be the set of all propositional variables
occurring in the formula ϕ , defined inductively as follows.
7See Schurz [21] on comparative ceteris paribus laws.
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Before F
•
w
•
u1
•
u2
•
un
u
p,s,h
•
v1
•
v2
•
vk
v
p,m
After [{m}]F
•
w
•
u1
•
u2
•
un
u
p,s,h
•
v1
•
v2
•
vk
v
p,m
Figure 1: The Fine model before and after w is upgraded to unlhd{m}w .
UD(p) = {p}
UD(¬ϕ) = UD(ϕ)
UD(ϕ ∨ψ) = UD(ϕ)∪UD(ψ)
UD([ϕ ,Γ]ψ) = UD(ϕ)∪UD(Γ)∪UD(ψ)
UD({γ1, . . . ,γn}) = UD(γ1)∪ ·· ·∪UD(γn).
Then the ceteris paribus counterfactual if ϕ were the case then, ceteris paribus, ψ would be the case
amounts to the expression
[ϕ ,Prop\ (UD(ϕ)∪UD(ψ))]ψ . (3)
Now all propositional variables not occurring in the universe of discourse of the counterfactual antecedent
or consequent are fixed.
Updating the Fine model with respect to von Wright’s ceteris paribus set yields the following model:
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M [∆][Γ]M
w •
w
s
•
u
p,s
•
v1
q,s
•
v2
q,r
•
w
s
•
u
p,s
•
v1
q,s
•
v2
q,r
u •
w
•
s
u
•
p,s
v1
•
q,s
v2
q,r
•
w
s
•
u
p,s
•
v1
q,s
•
v2
q,r
Figure 2: The horizontal panels labelled w and u define the similarity orders w and u respectively.
•
w
[{s,m}]F
•
u1
•
u2
•
un
u
p,s,h
•
v1
•
v2
•
vk
v
p,m
We have F ,w |= [p,{m,s}]h, but vacuously! It appears that the relation unlhdΓ is too strong to interact
with von Wright’s definition. We are requiring that everything else is kept equal. This is questionable
metaphysics, to say the least. Lewis made a similar observation in [15], about the counterfactual ‘if
kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’:
We might think it best to confine our attention to worlds where kangaroos have no tails and
everything else is as it actually is; but there are no such worlds. Are we to suppose that
kangaroos have no tails but that their tracks in the sand are as they actually are? Then we
shall have to suppose that these tracks are produced in a way quite different from the actual
way. [...] Are we to suppose that kangaroos have no tails but that their genetic makeup is
as it actually is? Then we shall have to suppose that genes control growth in a way quite
different from the actual way (or else that there is something, unlike anything there actually
is, that removes the tails). And so it goes; respects of similarity and difference trade off. If
we try too hard for exact similarity to the actual world in one respect, we will get excessive
differences in some other respect. ([15, p. 9])
P. Girard and M. A. Triplett 185
In fact, for the logic of ceteris paribus counterfactuals to function in a meaningful fashion, every
formula occurring in Γ must be independent from the counterfactual antecedent. In the Fine model, we
insist that the truth values of s and m are kept fixed. These propositions, however, are nomologically
related to p, so we can’t change the truth value of p without affecting the truth values of s and m. This is
why the counterfactual [p,{m,s}]h is vacuously true, but then so is the counterfactual [p,{m,s}]¬h. To
accommodate a uniform method for selecting ceteris paribus clauses, more flexibility is required. What
ought to be kept equal when we can’t keep everything else equal? In the next section we will consider
two strategies for relaxing the interpretation of ceteris paribus to address this question.
7 Relaxing the ceteris paribus clause
7.1 Naı¨ve counting
We will now introduce another interpretation for the modality [ϕ ,Γ]ψ . Let us write J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKM
CP
for
the set J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKM from Definition 4, and let |=CP act as the ordinary satisfaction relation for Boolean
formulas, but with
M,w |=CP [ϕ ,Γ]ψ iff w ∈ J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKMCP.
Whereas in Definition 4 we required strict agreement on the set Γ, in order to develop a logic for
ceteris paribus counterfactuals with a weaker semantics we will instead relax the requirement to maximal
agreement. The best we can do is preserve the set Γ as much as possible for any given model.
Let Γ⊆LCP be finite, and let M= (W,,V ) be a conditional model. Define AMΓ : W ×W → 2Γ by
AMΓ (u,v) = {γ ∈ Γ : M,u |= γ iff M,v |= γ}. (4)
Define the relation Γw on Ww by uΓw v iff
either |AMΓ (u,w)| > |AMΓ (v,w)|, or |AMΓ (u,w)| = |AMΓ (v,w)| and uw v.
The relation Γw can be seen as a transformed w, reordering the similarity order so that worlds closer
to w preserve at least as much of Γ as worlds further away, and if any two worlds agree on Γ to the same
quantity, then the nearer world is more similar to w with respect to .
Definition 5 (Semantics) Let M = (W,,V ) be a conditional model satisfying the limit assumption.
Let Γ⊆LCP be finite. Then
J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKM
NC
= {w ∈W : MinΓw(JϕK
M)⊆ JψKM}.
We write M,w |=NC [ϕ ,Γ]ψ iff w ∈ J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKMNC.
Fact 1 Let M= (W,,V ) be a conditional model. Let w∈W , and let X∈ {CP,NC}. Then the following
are true, where ±α is shorthand which uniformly stands for either α or ¬α:
1. M,w |= ϕ ψ iff M,w |=X [ϕ , /0]ψ
186 Ceteris paribus logic in counterfactual reasoning
2. M,w |=X (±α ∧〈ϕ ,Γ〉(±α ∧ψ))→ 〈ϕ ,Γ∪{α}〉ψ
3. M,w |=CP 〈ϕ ,Γ〉ψ ⇒M,w |=NC 〈ϕ ,Γ〉ψ
4. M,w |=NC [ϕ ,Γ]ψ ⇒M,w |=CP [ϕ ,Γ]ψ
The original ceteris paribus preference logic [2] could be axiomatised using standard axioms together
with Fact 1.2 and its converse. A crucial difference with NC semantics is that the converse of Fact 1.2
does not hold. The existence of a ϕ ∧ψ-world which maximally agrees on Γ∪{α} does not ensure that
α actually holds at that world. In fact, it is not guaranteed that any formula from Γ∪{α} is obtained.
7.2 Maximal supersets
An approach to counterfactuals familiar to the AI community [5–7,14] makes use of a selection function
which chooses the ‘closest’ world according to maximal sets of propositional variables. More specif-
ically, each world w satisfies some set Pw ⊆ Prop of propositional variables, and a world u is a world
closest to w if there is no v with Pu ⊂ Pv ⊆ Pw. Taking this as a kind of ceteris paribus formalism we
obtain the following variant of our ceteris paribus counterfactuals. First let us define the relation ⊑Γw on
Ww by u⊑Γw v iff
either AMΓ (v,w)⊂ AMΓ (u,w), or AMΓ (v,w) = AMΓ (u,w) and uw v.
Definition 6 (Semantics) Let M = (W,,V ) be a conditional model satisfying the limit assumption.
Let Γ⊂LCP be finite. Then
J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKM
MS
= {w ∈W : Min⊑Γw(JϕK
M)⊆ JψKM}.
We write M,w |=MS [ϕ ,Γ]ψ iff w∈ J[ϕ ,Γ]ψKMMS. Now Γ is maximally preserved in the sense that worlds
which preserve the same propositions as another, and furthermore preserve additional propositions from
Γ, are deemed to approximate Γ more closely; while worlds u,v with neither AMΓ (u,w) ⊆ AMΓ (v,w) nor
AMΓ (v,w)⊆ AMΓ (u,w) are considered incomparable.
Fact 2 (Extends Fact 1) Let M= (W,,V ) be a conditional model. Let w ∈W. Then the following are
true.
1. M,w |= ϕ ψ iff M,w |=MS [ϕ , /0]ψ
2. M,w |=MS (±α ∧〈ϕ ,Γ〉(±α ∧ψ))→ 〈ϕ ,Γ∪{α}〉ψ
3. M,w |=CP 〈ϕ ,Γ〉ψ ⇒M,w |=MS 〈ϕ ,Γ〉ψ
4. M,w |=MS [ϕ ,Γ]ψ ⇒M,w |=CP [ϕ ,Γ]ψ
8 Dynamics and the Nixon counterfactual
Given a ceteris paribus interpretation X ∈ {CP,NC,MS}, let us write [Γ]XM for the model M updated
with a ceteris paribus clause Γ according to interpretation X. Specifically, we have the following defini-
tion.
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Definition 7 Let M= (W,,V ) be a conditional model, and let Γ⊆LCP be a finite set of formulas. We
define the updated models [Γ]XM, for X ∈ {CP,NC,MS}, by
[Γ]CPM := (W,unlhdΓ,V );
[Γ]NCM := (W,Γ,V );
[Γ]MSM := (W,⊑Γ,V ).
This provides us with three dynamic ceteris paribus updates. Let us see how they treat the Nixon
counterfactual. We have already witnessed the CP update with ceteris paribus sets {m} and {m,s}, and
concluded that both make the counterfactual true (vacuous truth with {m,s}). NC and MS updates agree
on the truth of the Nixon counterfactual with the CP update on {m}, but disagree on {m,s}. Updat-
ing the Fine model with von Wright’s ceteris paribus clause {m,s} according to the NC interpretation
yields F again. Thus F ,w 6|=NC [p,{m,s}]h. Updating Fine’s model with {m,s} according to the MS
interpretation gives the following model:
•
w
[{m,s}]MSF
•
u1
•
u2
•
un
u
p,s,h
•
v1
•
v2
•
vk
v
p,m
In [{m,s}]MSF the Nixon counterfactual is not true, and neither is p ¬h.
We summarise the truth of the Nixon counterfactuals p h and p ¬h in the various updated
Fine models in the following table.
Interpretation
Counterfactual Clause CP NC MS
p h {m} true true true
{m,s} true false false
p ¬h {m} false false false
{m,s} true true false
The rows labelled with p h and p ¬h indicate the truth value of those counterfactuals in
the updated models [Γ]XF , where Γ is given by the cell in the Clause column and X is given by the
Interpretation column.
Formally, the table illustrates how different truth values for the Nixon counterfactual may be obtained
by combining the various interpretations of ceteris paribus (CP,NC,MS) with the different ceteris paribus
sets (the selected set {m} or von Wright’s set {m,s}). But this doesn’t mean that all combinations are
legitimate formalisations of Fine’s argument. Fine’s story is about small miracles that can interfere with
Nixon’s ploy, not about whether the missile would successfully launch should Nixon press the button.
That the proposition s must be able to vary is crucial to the story, so one shouldn’t attempt to keep it
equal, on a par with m. We adhere to our favoured formalisation of the Nixon argument in which the
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proposition m is the only one that needs to be kept equal. We have given principled reasons for this
choice, and our selection makes the counterfactual true – all interpretations agree on that. The point
of the table is a formal one, namely that the truth-values of counterfactuals vary with different ceteris
paribus updates according to their interpretation.
9 Theorems
In the appendix (Corollary 1) we prove that the logic ΛLCP
C
of ceteris paribus counterfactuals over the
class of conditional frames C is complete for CP/NC/MS semantics. The proof works by translating
formulas of LCP into formulas of a comparative possibility language, in the style of Lewis, and ax-
iomatising the equivalent logic. This permits a clearer reduction of ceteris paribus modalities to basic
comparative possibility operators, albeit with a translation exponential in the size of Γ.
10 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced a ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning by adapting the formalism
in [2]. We have introduced some variants on ceteris paribus logic in light of philosophical difficulties
arising in the application of conditionals. We apply our framework to the Nixon counterfactual, and with
this bring a new perspective to the problem. We have suggested and explored the dynamic perspective
of our various syntactic interpretations of ceteris paribus, which has resulted in a richer understanding
of so-called comparative ceteris paribus reasoning in formal settings. We have provided completeness
theorems which demonstrate that the ceteris paribus logics so obtained ultimately reduce to the underly-
ing counterfactual logic; in our case Lewis’ VC. With our framework we defend Lewisian semantics by
appealing to examples from preference logic, where ceteris paribus reasoning is more widely discussed.
Finally, we outline some limitations of our framework and directions for future research.
Iterated ceteris paribus actions. We saw in Section 5 that iterated ceteris paribus counterfactuals devi-
ate in truth-value from the corresponding update-then-counterfactual sequence. Such difficulties with
iterated counterfactuals are not so uncommon. We leave the task of understanding the full interaction
between the two for further investigation.
Cardinality restrictions on Γ. In general, ceteris paribus reasoning requires keeping equal as much
information as possible, and sometimes unknown information (for example, unanticipated defeaters of
laws). Keeping everything else equal may indeed mean keeping equal an indefinite, and possibly infinite,
set of things. Exploring ceteris paribus logic without cardinality restrictions to Γ is thus more than a mere
technical exercise. But it is not so straightforward to extend the present framework to accommodate the
presence of infinite Γ. The translations presented in the appendix only carry over to the infinite case
for infinitary languages, which is not much of a solution. For the strict ceteris paribus semantics, we
instead suggest following the δ -flexibility approach of [22]. For the relaxed ceteris paribus semantics,
there are conceptual difficulties which arise with the comparison of infinite sets: when should we say of
two infinite sets that one keeps more things equal than the other? Clearly naı¨ve counting will not suffice.
Minimising distance with respect to ⊑Γ is more promising, but has its own problems. We leave this
challenging technical enterprise for future research.
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A Appendix
We first recast Definition 3 in a more formally precise manner.
Definition 8 For each ordinal α let Lα be given by
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ψ | [ϕ ,Γ]ψ
where Γ⊆Lβ is finite and β < α . LCP is then defined to be ⋃α Lα .
This ensures the sets Γ are well-defined. One can define a language L of comparative possibility in
a similar style, though we will only give the following grammar
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ψ | ϕ  ψ | ϕ Γ ψ | ϕunlhdΓ ψ | ϕ ⊑Γ ψ .
We further set
ϕ ≺ ψ := ¬(ψ  ϕ); ϕ ≺Γ ψ := ¬(ψ Γ ϕ); ϕΓ ψ := ¬(ψunlhdΓ ϕ);
ϕ <Γ ψ := ¬(ψ ⊑Γ ϕ); 3ϕ := ϕ ≺⊥; ϕ := ¬3¬ϕ .
Definition 9 (Semantics) Let M,w be a conditional model. Then
JpKM = V (p);
J⊥KM = /0;
J¬ϕKM = W \ JϕKM;
Jϕ ∨ψKM = JϕKM∪ JψKM;
Jϕ  ψKM = {w ∈W : ∀u ∈Ww ∃v ∈Ww such that if u ∈ JψKM then v ∈ JϕKM and vw u};
Jϕ Γ ψKM = {w ∈W : ∀u ∈Ww ∃v ∈Ww such that if u ∈ JψKM then v ∈ JϕKM and vΓw u};
JϕunlhdΓ ψKM = {w ∈W : ∀u ∈ [w]Γ ∃v ∈ [w]Γ such that if u ∈ JψKM then v ∈ JϕKM and vunlhdΓw u};
Jϕ ⊑Γ ψKM = {w ∈W : ∀u ∈Ww ∃v ∈Ww such that if u ∈ JψKM then v ∈ JϕKM and v⊑Γw u}.
Lemma 1 The modal operator [ϕ ,Γ]ψ under NC semantics is definable in L .
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PROOF: We show that
M,w |=NC [ϕ ,Γ]ψ iff M,w |=3ϕ → (ϕ ∧ψ)≺Γ (ϕ ∧¬ψ).
⇒: Assume M,w |= 3ϕ . Then there is a world x ∈ Ww such that M,x |= ϕ . So, by assumption,
MinunlhdΓw(JϕK
M) 6= /0 and MinunlhdΓw(JϕK
M) ⊆ JψKM. Hence, there exists y ∈Ww such that M,y |= ϕ ∧ψ
and for every world z∈Ww, if zΓw y then z 6∈ Jϕ∧¬ψKM. This is exactly M,w |= (ϕ ∧ψ)≺Γ (ϕ ∧¬ψ).
⇐: By contrapositive. Assume M,w 6|= [ϕ ,Γ]ψ . Then, by the semantic definition, there is an x ∈
MinunlhdΓw(JϕK
M) such that x 6∈ JψKM. So M,w |= 3ϕ , and for every x ∈Ww, there exists y ∈Ww (namely
v) such that if x ∈ Jϕ ∧ψKM, then yΓw x and x ∈ Jϕ ∧¬ψKM. Hence, M,w |= (ϕ ∧¬ψ)Γ (ϕ ∧ψ), so
M,w 6|= (ϕ ∧ψ)≺Γ (ϕ ∧¬ψ), and we are done. 
Lemma 2 The modal operator [ϕ ,Γ]ψ under CP semantics is definable in L .
PROOF: Replace Γw with unlhdΓw in the above proof to show that the following equivalence
M,w |=CP [ϕ ,Γ]ψ iff M,w |=3ϕ → (ϕ ∧ψ)Γ (ϕ ∧¬ψ).
holds. 
Lemma 3 The modal operator [ϕ ,Γ]ψ under MS semantics is definable in L .
PROOF: Replace Γw with ⊑Γw in the above proof to show that the following equivalence holds
M,w |=MS [ϕ ,Γ]ψ iff M,w |=3ϕ → (ϕ ∧ψ)<Γ (ϕ ∧¬ψ).

Denote by L − the L -fragment given by
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ψ | ϕ  ψ .
Given a set Γ⊆L or Γ⊆L −, let Γ∗ be the set of all possible conjunctions of formulas and negated
formulas from Γ; that is, the set of all ψ such that ψ = ∧
γ∈Γ
±γ , where +γ = γ and −γ = ¬γ . So if
Γ = {p,¬q} then
Γ∗ = {p∧¬q,¬p∧¬q, p∧¬¬q,¬p∧¬¬q}.
We will often identity a conjunction ϕ1∧ ·· ·∧ϕn with the set {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn}.
Lemma 4 The modal operator unlhdΓ of L is definable in L −.
PROOF: We show that
ϕunlhdΓ ψ ↔
∧
γ∈Γ∗
[γ → (ϕ ∧ γ) (ψ ∧ γ)] . (5)
⇒: Without loss of generality write M,w |= γ . Let u ∈Ww and suppose M,u |= ψ ∧ γ . By hypothesis
there exists v ∈ [w]Γ such that M,v |= ϕ and vunlhdΓw u. Now v≡Γ w, so M,v |= γ , and vw u as required.
⇐: Write M,w |= γ . Then M,w |= (ϕ ∧ γ) (ψ ∧ γ). Let u ∈ [w]Γ and suppose that M,u |= ψ . Then
M,u |= ψ ∧ γ , so there exists v ∈Ww with M,v |= ϕ ∧ γ and vw u. Then v≡Γ w, and so vunlhdΓw u. 
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Lemma 5 The modal operator ⊑Γ of L is expressible in L −.
PROOF: We show that
ϕ ⊑Γ ψ ↔
∧
γ∈Γ∗
(
γ →
∧
λ⊆γ
[ ∧
λ⊂λ ′⊆γ
¬3(ϕ ∧λ ′)→ (ϕ ∧λ ) (ψ ∧λ )
])
(6)
⇒: Suppose M,w |= ϕ ⊑Γ ψ with M,w |= γ , for some γ ∈ Γ∗. Take λ ⊆ γ such that
M,w |=
∧
λ⊂λ ′⊆γ
¬3(ϕ ∧λ ′). (7)
Take v ∈Ww arbitrary such that M,v |= ψ ∧λ . By the hypothesis there is u ∈Ww such that u ⊑Γw v and
M,u |= ϕ .
Now, u⊑Γw v implies that
(†) either AMΓ (v,w)⊂ AMΓ (u,w), or AMΓ (v,w) = AMΓ (u,w) and uw v.
If AMΓ (v,w) ⊂ AMΓ (u,w), then λ ⊆ AMΓ (v,w) implies that λ ⊂ AMΓ (u,w). Furthermore, M,u |= ϕ ∧
AMΓ (u,w). Take λ ′ := AMΓ (u,w), then M,u |= ϕ ∧λ ′, and hence
M,w |= ¬
∧
λ⊂λ ′⊆γ
¬3(ϕ ∧λ ′),
contradicting (7).
Thus by (†), AMΓ (v,w) =AMΓ (u,w) and uw v. Finally, since λ ⊆AMΓ (v,w) and M,u |=ϕ∧AMΓ (u,w),
we have that M,u |= ϕ ∧λ , as desired.
⇐: Assume the right-hand side of (6). There is a unique γ ∈ Γ∗ for which M,w |= γ . Take u ∈Ww such
that M,u |= ψ , and consider AMΓ (u,w).
Case 1 There is an x ∈Ww such that AMΓ (u,w) ⊂ AMΓ (x,w) and M,x |= ϕ . Then x ⊑Γw u, by definition
of ⊑Γw.
Case 2 There is no x ∈Ww such that AMΓ (u,w) ⊂ AMΓ (x,w) and M,x |= ϕ . Now, if there is y ∈Ww and
a set of formulas λ ′ with AMΓ (u,w) ⊂ λ ′ ⊆ γ such that M,y |= ϕ ∧λ ′, then AMΓ (u,w) ⊂ λ ′ ⊆ AMΓ (y,w)
and M,y |= ϕ , contradicting our assumption. Hence
M,w |=
∧
AMΓ (u,w)⊂λ ′⊆γ
¬3(ϕ ∧λ ′),
and by taking λ := AMΓ (w,u), our initial assumption implies that
M,w |= (ϕ ∧AMΓ (u,w))  (ψ ∧AMΓ (u,w)).
Since M,u |= ψ ∧AMΓ (u,w), there is an x w u such that M,x |= ϕ ∧AMΓ (u,w). Hence AMΓ (u,w) ⊆
AMΓ (x,w), and also AMΓ (x,w) ⊆ AMΓ (u,w) as the containment cannot be proper by the case assumption.
So AMΓ (u,w) = AMΓ (x,w), and since xw u, one has that x⊑Γw u.
Hence, both cases imply that there exists an x⊑Γw u such that M,x |= ϕ , as desired. 
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Lemma 6 The modal operator Γ of L is definable in L −.
PROOF: Replace the subset condition
λ ⊂ λ ′ ⊆ γ
in (6) with the cardinality condition
|λ |< |λ ′| ≤ |γ |
and repeat the above process. 
Notice that, if Γ∪{ϕ ,ψ} ⊆L −, then the right hand sides of the equivalences established above are
in L −. This allows us to apply the translation to a formula from the inside-out, the resulting formula
belonging to L −.
By a conditional frame we mean a pair F = (W,), such that (F,V ) is a conditional model for any
valuation function V . Let C be the class of conditional frames. Using the notation from [3], we write ΛL
C
for the set of L-formulas valid over C.
Theorem 1 The logic ΛL
C
is complete.
PROOF: We take as our axiomatisation the axioms for VC [15], plus the translations from Lemmas 4, 5,
and 6. 
Corollary 1 The logic ΛLCP
C
is complete for CP/NC/MS-semantics.
